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1. SUMMARY AND AIM OF THE COMMENTARY
The philosophy of prof. Van Duyne’s paper is that corruption is «a state of
mind» and that, though corruption is immoral, it is a human conduct that
people undertake sometimes deliberately, but also gradually. In democratic
systems public officials, operating on behalf of the community, should act
with a view to pursue the public interest. Each of them, however, has private
interests and goals not always coincident with those professed in public, and
might therefore be induced to exercise his/her discretionary power in his/her
own interest. Prof. van Duyne provides a straightforward and yet general
definition of corruption, according to which corruption is «an improbity or
decay in the decision-making process in which a decision-maker (in a
private corporation or in a public service) consents or demands to deviate
from the criterion which should rule his decision, in exchange for a reward,
the promise or expectation of it», while the motives of this decision cannot
be cited in justification of the decision itself. He therefore states that the most
important aspects influencing the levels and manifestations of corruption are
the accountability of decision makers and the erosion of it.
Taking into consideration prof. van Duyne’s paper, and with the parallel aim
of providing some information on the situation in Italy and other European
countries, this paper is divided into two parts.
The first paragraphs contain a commentary on Prof. Van Duyne’s theoretical
analysis of corruption. On the basis of the elements of corruption defined by
prof. van Duyne, the opportunities and risks connected with corruption will
then be identified in a theory of corruption as a rational choice, in order to
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3delineate more appropriate policies to combat it. The situation of corruption
in Italy is also briefly described.
In the second part, the action against corruption is analysed and the
contrast strategies introduced by some European countries, and by Italy in
particular, are described.
2. CORRUPTION AS A “STATE OF MIND”
In his paper Prof. van Duyne develops a behavioural theory of corruption in
which he starts by highlighting five necessary components of the concept
from the decision side. The first of these is a decision maker with discretionary
power to deviate from the rules in the decision making process, and who is
accountable for the propriety of the decisions made. Two further
components are involved: the exchange relation between the actors of
corruption and the hidden nature of this relation. This behavioural definition
of corruption as being a state of mind focuses on the individual decision
maker, and in Prof. van Duyne’s opinion is therefore very wide and can be
applied in every context and legal system. He uses a social-psychological
approach, and clearly states that, psychologically, corruption is not an
abnormal state of mind, but on the contrary rather human. He then classifies
corruption into nine categories, in all of which social-psychological factors
leading to corruption cases are identified. This behavioural approach,
however, seems to leave little if any space for human ratio and the possibility
that people make a rational analysis of advantages reachable through
corruption and of costs involved.
In Prof. Van Duyne’s analysis the natural development of simple one-to-one
corruption is towards the spreading of such illicit conduct, all the more if the
corrupt scheme becomes more complicated and requires the involvement
of other actors. Widening this behavioural perspective, therefore, corruption
gradually spreads, leading to a corrupt market and a loosening of public
morale.
In such a situation, corruption will increase and spread in every sector due to
a combined action of a decrease in the legitimacy of democratic
4institutions, in accountability of decision makers with discretionary power
and in transparency in general. A lengthy and important section of van
Duyne’s paper, in fact, examines the development of corrupt attitudes in a
working environment. In the scheme of corruption the role played by the
leader is fundamental, since Prof. Van Duyne argues that corruption
frequently develops in organisations as a top-down disease. In the cases of
both a leader with a great deal of decision-making power who is also prone
to corruption, and an honest but sloppy manager unaware of what is
happening among his subordinates, corruption develops because of defect
leadership, where standards of proper conduct have been eroded. He
states that corruption is a «process [which] is quite human and the transition
from non-corrupt but questionable conduct to the first stages of corruption
may, even to the participants themselves, unfold as an unnoticed growth
process». Again in the example here provided it is clear that fundamental
importance is given to psychological factors influencing corrupt behaviour,
while the positively and rationally calculated choice to engage in corruption
is not considered as a contributing factor.
2.1 The paradoxical story of the successful leader
The paradox thus delineated is that corruption may develop alongside
successful management. At first it may even be unseen, and then later
denied by the success of the leader. Taken in a more general sense, in Van
Duyne’s opinion this process also accounts for the development of
corruption into systemic proportions, as in the case of Italy.
The first phase of corruption by a successful leader consists of extravagance.
The example provided is that of a leader who does not justify his/her
excessive expenses: although there is no indication of corrupt behaviour, this
is the first stage in the development of a leadership style which deviates from
the proper management of public resources.
The next phase is that of the erosion of accountability. The paradox here is
that the more successful the leader is, the less s/he receives negative
feedback on his/her actions. «The increase in trust is inversely related to the
principle of accountability, but also to the mental openness to critical
evaluation of the deeds of the leader.» This will create a climate in which
unplausible expenses will be justified by «plausible» explanations. Employees
who do not agree with this conduct will frequently be replaced by more
5obedient ones willing to accept the erosion of the leader’s accountability
and the opacity of decision making processes.
Prof. van Duyne then identifies the ownership phase, where the leader of the
organisation starts behaving as if s/he were its actual owner. Extravagance
now gives way to the leader’s unrestrained use of corporate assets for
his/her own private and organisational purposes. The leader now needs a
court of yes-men who share his/her opinions and do not complain about the
non-transparent decisions taken. This also gives rise to a change in
recruitment procedures. New employees are now selected because of their
appreciation of the leader and not because of their skills. These are what
van Duyne aptly calls «Caligula appointments».
This behaviour quickly leads from favouritism to the phase of clientelism,
where the personnel appointed will tend to follow the example of the leader
and to nominate, in their turn, their favourite yes-men. The organisation has
now surpassed the threshold of corruption, and proper decision making
standards have been eroded.
In this example it is again very clear that only socio-psychological factors are
directing the action of the corrupt leader and his court of yes-men. The
attempt on the leader’s part to “justify” unjustifiable actions and decisions
do not seem to use logical, rational reasoning. The development of
favouritism and clientelism is characterised by a series of “rules” which do
not seem to follow objective, rational requirements. Even the recruitment
procedure, based on an oath of obedience to the leader rather than on the
actual skills on the prospective member, again does not involve a use of
rationality.
In van Duyne’s opinion, the manifestations of this leadership disease differ
depending on the interaction with the environment, which determines the
rules of the external accountability. This accountability may be imposed by
the law and the enforcement policies, as well as by normal business practice
and the public morale. There is, in fact, a second phase of corruption in
which the phenomenon moves from occurring solely within the enterprise to
corruption with the outside world. The first person at risk of being bribed is the
accountant of the enterprise, because the external rules of accountability
imply that the financial situation must show no sign of mismanagement. Then
it might be necessary to bribe a fellow entrepreneur into complicity. At some
6stage of this process, interaction with the authorities might begin, according
to the different entrepreneurial interests. The degree of intensity of this
interaction gives rise to three different levels of corruption, which van Duyne
identifies as:
– the executive level, where corruption concerns the daily practice of
entrepreneurs;
– the law enforcement level, when entrepreneurs are willing to bribe the
law enforcement authorities to prevent or postpone investigations;
– the strategic level, where preventing the authorities from carrying out their
duties requires access to the strategic command level. In this case there
may not be a discernible exchange of tangible goods, but rather a
development of mutual interests.
The examples of different categories of corruption made here highlight that,
although Prof. Van Duyne defines corruption as a human behaviour driven
by psychological factors, other external conditions are necessary in order to
corruption to develop and spread. First, the power to make decisions, either
lawful or unlawful is necessary, because he who does not have power will
neither corrupt nor be corrupted. Second, the existence and effectiveness
of external accountability rules will determine different levels of corruption
and variations in its diffusion.
Therefore, in order to explain variations in the diffusion of corruption and to
curb it, hypotheses must be formulated on the factors influencing the
phenomenon and on the role played by these components. Only then will it
be possible to elaborate proposals for policies to combat corruption.
One main question arises from the explanation of Prof. Van Duyne’s theory
on corruption, and is particularly relevant in the phase of development of
corruption into systemic proportions, where “corruption spreads to a corrupt
market and a loosening of business morale”. Since the analysis made by
Prof. Van Duyne emphasises the psychological factors influencing the action
of an individual and doesn’t directly include rationally taken decisions to
engage in corruption, the question remains regarding the role which can be
played by an economic approach towards corruption.
73. CORRUPTION AS A RATIONAL CHOICE
Starting from Prof. Van Duyne’s analysis, and using three of the components
he identified, it is in fact possible to develop a framework that considers
corruption as a phenomenon operating according to the rules of the market
place.1 The assumption there is that corruption is an illicit good, bought and
sold according to market conditions, and that the actors in this market, the
seller and the buyer of corruption, are rational human beings who engage in
an illicit transaction in order to maximise opportunities while at the same time
seeking to minimise the costs of being arrested and convicted, and of losing
a good reputation – a valuable commodity, especially for politicians. In
terms of contrast policies, the implication of this analysis is that, in order to
curb corruption it is necessary to affect the market by reducing the
opportunities and incentives to commit such offences, and by increasing the
risks at the same time.
If we accept that corruption is a rational choice2, the main question to be
answered is: why do individuals, whom we assume are rational human
beings, decide to behave in a corrupt manner? And a second
consequential question: what is the effect of this decision on  institutional
development? In other words, how does corruption, after infiltrating a
system, become systemic?
A summary of the variables taken into consideration by the various theories
on corruption, shows that a combination of factors tends to increase
opportunities for corruption. These factors are the number of decision-
makers, the amount of their discretionary power, their amount of
responsibility for the decisions made and enforcement of formal procedures
for the control of this power. In fact, when there is only one decision-maker,
“monopolistic corruption” increases, while the higher the number of
decision-makers (“competitive corruption”), the fewer opportunities there
are for corruption. Moreover, when discretionary power increases, so also do
                                           
1 E.U. Savona, “Beyond Criminal Law in Devising Anticorruption Policies. Lessons from the
Italian Experience”, in European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, vol. 3, n. 2,
Kugler Publications, Amsterdam/New York, 1995.
2 R.O. Tilman, “Emergency of Black Market Bureaucracy: Administrative Corruption in the
New States”, in Public Administration Review, n. 28, 1968. See also Van J. Klaveren, “The
Concept of Corruption”, in A.J. Heidenheimer (ed.), Political Corruption, Readings in
ComparativeAnalysis, New Brunswick, Transaction, 1970; B.L. Benson and J. Baden, “The
Political Economy of Governmental Corruption: The Logic of Underground Government”,
in Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XIV, June 1985.
8opportunities for corruption3, because the public official can allocate the
rights at his/her disposal so that some people have more advantages than
others.
Finally, the existence of formal procedures for the control of this power bring
about an increase in the «value» of corruption, thus increasing the cost for
the buyer while at the same time increasing the advantages for the seller.
Therefore, besides the strict economic advantage of a monetary bribe, the
benefits of engaging in corruption comprise every other kind of advantage
connected with a secret exchange of favours.
As derives from above, as discretionary power increases, so too do
opportunities for legal corruption, while the existence of precise formal
procedures for the control and regulation of discretionary power have the
effect of increasing the corruption value: in the sense that they increase the
cost for the buyer and augment the opportunities for corruption available to
the seller.
On the other hand, as corruption is a criminal offence, the actors in this
market have to take a number of risks connected to the commission of a
corruption offence into account. The costs of corruption can be analysed by
making use of Becker’s model as a theoretical framework for an economic
analysis of this crime.4 According to Becker, «a person commits an offence if
the expected utility is higher than the one he could receive by using his time
and other resources for other activities».5
Criminal law can play an important role in influencing human behaviour: it
imposes risks and therefore additional costs for criminal activities and
provides the offender an economic disincentive to commit the crime.6
The costs calculated by criminals before choosing to commit a corruption
offence influence the level of corruption in a country, and can be of two
different kinds: objective and subjective. On the one side, there are what
can be called institutional, objective costs. Among the costs involved in this
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Economy, n. 76, 1968, pp. 169-217.
5 G. Becker, op. cit., p. 176.
6 W.H Hirsh, Law and Economics. An Introductory Analysis, New York Academic Press Inc,
1979, p. 200.
9rational choice are the risk of law enforcement (that is, the risk of being
identified, prosecuted and punished) and information costs arising from the
loss of reputation in the community caused by a criminal charge for
corruption.
On the other side, there are also subjective costs, more difficult to observe
and measure since they reflect internal rather than institutional judgements,
but which nevertheless can be equally influential. There are in fact the
«moral» costs linked with an individual aversion to doing something illegal.
From this perspective, the willingness to commit a corruption offence
depends on whether the culture or the subculture in which the subject
operates possesses moral rules which sanction political or bureaucratic
illegality. In fact, there seems to be an attitude of general acceptance
towards illicit conduct intended to ensure an enterprise’s success. Like other
white-collar crimes, corruption is a criminal offence closely connected with
licit activities that have a positive social value. The manager who corrupts
therefore behaves in a twofold manner: although s/he abides by the
general rules of a system, s/he at the same time may violate rules which
interfere with the goals of his/her enterprise.7
The interaction between opportunities and costs will determine different
amounts of corruption. Prof. Van Duyne gives an example in which the role
played by an ineffective piece of legislation regulating one of the variables,
namely accountability, combined with a low set of moral rules, can
significantly favour the spreading of corruption.
The diffusion of this behaviour and its manifestations depends mainly on the
extent to which the rules of external accountability are imposed by law or
law enforcement, as well as by the public moral. In countries where
opportunities for corruption are high and are combined with low
accountability and moral rules, the trend will be towards the growth of
corruption to systemic proportions. This is, for example, the case of Italy,
where this development results from mechanisms whereby illicit conduct has
become the rule and where corruption is so routine and institutionalised that
organisations reward those who act illicitly and penalise those who comply
with the rules.8
                                           
7 Della Porta, Vannucci, Corruzione politica e amminstrazione pubblica. Risorse,
meccanismi, attori, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1994, p. 327.
8 CAIDEN G.E., CAIDEN N.J, «Administrative corruption», in Public Administration Review,
1977, p. 306, as cited in Della Porta, Vannucci, op. cit, p. 463.
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4. APPLYING THE PARADOX OF THE SUCCESSFUL LEADER TO THE ITALIAN CASE
Corruption in Italy seems to display the following features: it results from
highly rational choices made by political, economic and administrative
actors; and it ends in, but also flows from, continuous and stable relations
among public and private subjects. Traditional survey methods designed to
penetrate such corruption have fallen short of their goal, largely because of
the high levels of sophistication achieved in the processes of corruption and
the evident mutual interest of actors to hide a favourable but illicit
exchange. It causes devastating damage which affects both the economic
system and democratic institutions. Finally, it is circular in nature because it
tends to duplicate itself and spread, thereby becoming «systemic».9
In short, corruption in Italy has been the product of an old individualistic and
opportunistic culture combined with weak ethical and juridical rules. When it
becomes environmental corruption10, as described by the ex-judge of «Mani
Pulite», Antonio Di Pietro, corruption may render the rules of the market
devoid of content. This is an evolved form of corruption in which a bribe is
not paid in order to win a particular contract, but in order to enter the small
group of businessmen with access to a certain market. The payment of
bribes becomes a practice which continues even when the official
changes. In this way corruption infiltrates the market machinery and
eliminates the rules of competition that should favour the strongest.
Cases of corruption are certainly much more numerous than those which
have actually been discovered. Investigations and trials have highlighted
the existence of a system in which the necessity to pay bribes – in order to
obtain subsidies or to conclude agreements – has become the generally
accepted rule. It is therefore possible to argue that the cases detected are
not exceptions, but rather a small proportion of a much more widespread
pathology. On the other hand, recently discovered examples of corruption
demonstrate that scandals and trials, far from eliminating corruption, in
many cases only make paying bribes riskier (and thus more expensive). Thus
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10 Environmental corruption is a situation in which the subject giving the bribe does not even
wait to be asked for it, because he knows that in that specific «environment» it is
customary to pay bribes, and he therefore promises to pay it.
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corruption grows more sophisticated and the fight against it is consequently
becoming more difficult.
5. ACTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
Given the picture outlined above in which corrupt behaviour is defined as a
leadership disease, the problem is to devise measures able to prevent
corruption.
The economic analysis of corruption developed in paragraph three can
provide guidelines to policy makers. In other words, an effective fight against
corruption must de directed at creating a market with a low level of
corruption. According to the economic analysis the fewer the decision
makers, the higher their discretionary power and as the level of responsibility
of decision makers decreases, the opportunities for corruption increase. In a
low-corruption market, there are likely to be more sources of regulation, i.e.,
more institutions which offer contracts, and more competition among the
firms participating in the bidding procedure. Those responsible for making
decisions should be constrained by a system where the decision-making
process is rationalised (discretionary power) and reported in written form
(responsibility) and consequently accessible to everyone.
Although penal measures have a deterrent effect, because they increase
the cost of corruption, it is evident that their essential function is to control
crime by punishing offences already committed. However, corruption
cannot be combated only by penal means. Penal sanctions should be
adopted with caution, since they may also have undesired effects: for
example, they may increase the price of corruption, that is the bribe.
Starting from the fact that corruption is a leadership disease, efforts to fight
and prevent it must seek to change behaviour and attitudes at the highest
levels of private and public leadership. Such action, according to van
Duyne, should follow two basic principles: namely, the transparency
principle and the first servant principle.
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The transparency principle is the basis of accountability, and to ensure its
application, codes of conduct, for example, have been elaborated. Van
Duyne, however, highlights that the preventive application of this principle
might be rather difficult, and, especially when applied above the executive
level, only formally applied. This would again erode the accountability
mentioned above. Its repressive application may also prove to be difficult: if
closely linked to what can be proven under the penal code, and if there is
no in-depth investigation, rapid penal action will be welcome: a few
executives will be dismissed and public opinion satisfied, but they will soon
be replaced by others who behave similarly.
The second principle mentioned by van Duyne is the first servant principle.
This holds that the leader should be the first servant of the organisation, and
that no one is so important that rules do not apply to him or her. Compliance
with this principle seems to be as difficult as in the case just mentioned. Using
the excuse that the exception proves the rule is a human trait which
nonetheless creates the tendency to bend the rules in one’s own interest.
5.1 What instruments for fighting corruption?
As a criminal offence, corruption is covered by the penal codes of many
countries and is severely punished. Penal sanctions, however, have proven
to be inadequate: they are both ineffective and inefficient. It is therefore
necessary to elaborate different policies which aim to reduce opportunities
for corruption. The following sections provide an overview of the strategies
recently introduced by some European countries to control and prevent
corruption. They show the practical application of the two principles
analysed by prof. Van Duyne.
5.1.1. A comparative analysis
In the last few years the fight against corruption has been the topic of
studies, proposals, reforms and conventions in various countries and at the
international level. The level of corruption, though, differs significantly from
country to country: whereas in some (such as France and Italy) it is systemic,
in others (like Sweden, Finland and Denmark) it is casual.11
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Many countries, such as Austria12, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands,
Greece, Portugal and Norway are trying to reform the organisation and
structure of the public administration, the aim being to reduce the
opportunities for corruption.13 Many have recently elaborated and
introduced new codes of conduct for public employees and officials. Some
countries, notably Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium
and Portugal, have introduced the obligation for public employees to make
financial declarations of their assets in order to improve transparency in the
public sector.14 Another common ground for action in many countries is the
creation of ad hoc anti-corruption authorities.
In the last ten years France has enacted three important items of legislation
paying particular attention to the financing of politic parties. In 1988 a law
was passed which requires members of the Government and of Parliament,
presidents of regional assemblies and mayors to provide information on their
initial and final assets. The same law for the first time disciplines the financing
of political parties and of elections. In 1993 a study commission, tasked with
proposing modifications to the legislation in force, recommended the
adoption of codes of conduct, increased transparency in the public
administration as well as in private corporations, the tightening of controls
over corporations in order to prevent slush funds and tax evasion, and the
modification of some penal provisions. In 1993 a Service Central de
Prévention de la Corruption15 was also established with the tasks of providing
documentation and information for judicial authorities investigating
corruption cases, and of giving advice to the public administration.
As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, important recommendations for
combating corruption are set out in the report by the Nolan Commission
which was set up in 1995. The report stresses the importance of codes of
conduct, of internal and external checks on the public administration by
independent bodies, and of the training of public employees. Greater
transparency is required in the lobbying activities of members of Parliament
and in the authorisation of consultancies.
                                           
12  «Austria’s administrative reform programme», in Focus, Public Management Gazette,
Puma, n. 9, June 1998.
13 OCSE, «Ethics in the Public Service: Current Issues and Practice», in Occasional Papers, n.
14, 1998, Puma, pp. 19-26 and 99.
14  OCSE, op. cit., p. 57.
15 Law n. 93-122, 29 January 1993, Journal Officiel de la République Française, 30 January
1993, p. 1587.
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The causes of corruption in Spain have been identified as the ineffectiveness
of the rules on the financing of politics, the great presence of the state in
society and the economy, and the weakness of its structures. The debate,
however, has centred mainly on repressive measures, such as a tightening of
sanctions, revising the penal procedure or creating a special jurisdiction for
economic crimes with advantages for those who collaborate. In 1995 the
Anti-Corruption Prosecuting Service was set up with special powers to
investigate crimes against the public administration. Consisting of
investigating magistrates, this service also has a special police unit and
experts in tax and administrative law.
5.1.2. The Italian experience
The Italian experience since 1992 has shown that penal action may be
unable to affect the origins and causes of systemic corruption rooted in
popular attitudes and behaviour.16 Besides the magnitude of the problem,
Italy differs from other countries in that corruption has infiltrated every level
of public decision-making. Corruption has been discovered both in large-
scale decisions involving extensive financial resources and in local ones of
ordinary administrative procedure.
For this reason, attention should focus not on the tightening of penal
sanctions, but on legislative measures intended to ensure transparency in
sectors where corruption may more easily develop. The problem is one of
prevention and administrative controls, of the deregulation or re-regulation
as the case may be of markets more susceptible to corruption. Little has
been done to introduce measures to reduce discretionary power, to limit
monopolistic decision-making by individual public administrators and to
enhance accountability at the same time.17 A correlated problem is that of
                                           
16 E.U. Savona, «Beyond criminal law in devising anticorruption policies. Lessons from the
Italian experience», in European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, vol. 3, n. 2,
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17 The following extract is taken from an essay on the conference on corruption held at
Dithchley Park in 1998 (Oxfordshire, England) and related to some of the causes of
corruption: «… a number of factors favourable to such conduct were noticed, such as…
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making and process implementation.» (Maurice Copithorne, Corruption: Progress in
Counter-strategies, Ditchley Conference Report No. D98/02, The Ditchley Foundation,
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creating incentives for more moral behaviour by public administrators,
working on levels of discretionary powers together with responsibility.
Italy has recently enacted a number of laws covering the public
administration. In 1990, two laws were enacted, respectively on local
authorities18 and on administrative proceedings19, with a view to improving
the efficiency of the administration and providing citizens with greater
opportunities to control the decisions made by the public administration.
More recently, in 1997 the Italian Parliament enacted three important pieces
of legislation concerning institutional and administrative reform in order to
change the rationale of the public administration. The laws decentralise
local autonomies, reform public-sector employment, simplify administrative
procedures, change control systems, and reform  the state budget.
Two of these laws act in the direction highlighted by van Duyne by
enhancing accountability and increasing transparency. Law n. 59 of 1997
empowers the government to issue, by legislative decree, a general code of
conduct for the public administration and to adopt special codes for the
various sectors of the administration. The government is also empowered to
create institutional bodies with control and counselling functions in relation
to these codes. Moreover, law n. 94 of 1997 sets out a new structure for the
state budget. Each individual item of state expenditure is now linked with
what has been termed a ‘function-goal’, by which is meant that the
objectives of every item of expenditure must be clearly specified. This linking
of every expense-creating public sector policy to a well-defined goal makes
it possible to measure output by the public administration in terms of the
quantity and quality of the services supplied to citizens. The law also
establishes ‘centres of administrative accountability’ responsible for the
management of each single item of expenditure and headed by senior
public officers accountable for their performance.
These legislative changes, however, have not had the desired result of
radically modifying the structure and attitudes of the public administration.
                                                                                                                                     
Oxfordshire, England, 1998, as cited in A. Di Nicola, «Anti-corruption measures in the
Italian experience. Towards the reduction of opportunities for corruption», paper
prepared for The XII International Congress on Criminology, International Society of
Criminology, Seoul, Korea, 24th-29th August 1998).
18 Law n. 142, 8 June 1990.
19 Law n. 241, 7 August 1990.
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Analysis of the causes of corruption as well as proposals for action has been
conducted by two different initiatives, respectively, by the Italian Parliament
and the Government.
On 27 September 1996 a study Committee on the prevention of corruption
was established with the task of proposing legislative measures to prevent
corruption. The means to be adopted for this purpose were identified in
accordance with the constitutional principles of the impartiality of the public
administration and of the loyalty and responsibility of employees.
Among the measures considered more appropriate in the short run are
codes of conduct and financial declarations for public officials. In the
medium run, more appropriate seem to be reducing state intervention in the
economy, separating the selection and career of public employees from
politics, and modifying the stipulation of contracts in the public sector.
Finally, in the long run, the effective means are those aimed at preventing
corruption: the re-organisation and simplification of legislation, the
simplification of administrative proceedings, and a system of controls based
on results rather than on processes.
On 26 September 1996 a Special Commission for the examination of bills on
the prevention and repression of corruption was set up by the Chamber of
Deputies and tasked with analysing twenty bills on the repression and
prevention of corruption. Working with a deadline of 31 October 1996, the
Commission identified four main issues: the control of legality and
transparency in the public administration; transparency in politics and its
disciplining together with economic activity; the awarding of contracts by
the public administration; and the relation between penal and
administrative proceedings by public employees.
On 31 March 1998 the Commission presented eight bills to Parliament. Four
of them are of particular relevance, since they seek to enhance
transparency and accountability.
The first deals with lobbying activities. It defines what is to be considered
lobbying activity and regulates it for the first time, listing in detail all actions
which are unlawful and the obligations which must be fulfilled. The second
bill deals with controls on contracting activity by administrations: it provides
for a new system of external controls on the awarding of contracts in order
17
to ascertain conformity with the general objectives of the administration,
legitimacy, efficiency and profitability.
A further proposal is to establish an authority ensuring legality and
transparency in the public administration. Among the tasks of this authority
would be the gathering of information and data in order to supervise public
offices. It would also monitor the fulfilment of obligations and investigate the
financial situation of public employees, informing the judiciary or the
competent administrative bodies of any irregularity.
Finally, a fourth bill proposes changes to the penal code. In an endeavour to
devise remedies to facilitate investigations and to sever the relationship
between the actors of corruption, rather than tighten sanctions, the bill
proposes a variety of sanctions, which are reduced in the case of
collaboration and aggravated in that of obstruction of the action of
magistrates.
Apart from these initiatives by Parliament, a Ministerial Decree of 7
November 1996 set up a study commission to curb corruption and improve
action by the public administration through measures to improve the quality
of administration and to prevent corrupt practices. The Commission was of
the opinion that the malfunctions which permit the development of
corruption can be eliminated by re-organising the public administration, and
that the best instrument to prevent corruption is an efficient administration,
where transparency and efficiency are ensured, and the responsibility of
public officials is better defined. It is therefore necessary to eliminate the gap
between the law «in the book» and the law «in action». The Commission has
made several suggestions: increasing the role of technical bodies both in
national and local administrations; increasing the decision-making powers of
public managers, reducing the political pressure on them; fostering the
territorial mobility of public employees; and promoting the adoption and
implementation of codes of conduct, ensuring that effective disciplinary
sanctions are applied to those who do not comply.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
Some brief conclusions can be drawn from this analysis and might be useful
for further discussion. The analysis of corruption, particularly in Italy, has made
it clear that criminal law remains an essential component in the fight against
corruption. In fact, «criminal law can play an important role by influencing
human behaviour, imposing additional costs on the criminal activities and
providing the single person with an economic incentive not to commit an
offence… ».20 However, penal sanctions can play their most effective role
only if aided by a number of other measures, thus constituting a
comprehensive, far-reaching and long term anti-corruption strategy.
First, incentives should be provided for the «producers of morality»: schools,
families, cultural, religious and political associations. The means to do this are
various, and they might involve appropriate legislative reforms, the
redirecting of public expenses, and additional public investments. Second,
as regards the disincentives for the «destroyers of morality», whether these
are organised crime, managers of corporations creating slush funds,
international corruptors, all the possible strategies should be used. For
example, a more  intelligent use of penal and administrative law can make
great inroads in anti-corruption efforts, as can a more efficient deployment
of the law enforcement and judicial authorities responsible for preventing
and controlling corruption. Greater emphasis should be given to self-
regulation by means of codes of conduct providing for a variety of
administrative sanctions, to the expulsion from the corporation or the public
administration office.21
Finally, since the focal point of corruption still remains the public
administration, it is important that, in the long term, legislative reforms such
as those envisaged in Italy are implemented, in order to de-regulate and re-
regulate a sector which is often characterised by great confusion and which
thus provides enormous opportunities for the illicit exchange of favours.
                                           
20 W.H Hirsh, op. cit., p. 200.
21 For a more extensive analysis see S. Chiri, «Suggerimenti per controllare la corruzione e
minimizzare i danni», in L. Barca, S. Trento (eds), L’economia della corruzione, Laterza,
Bari, 1994, p. 151 ss.
